

Allen Dulles Warns:

TROUBLE AHEAD FROM RUSSIA'S SURPLUS GUNS

CPYRGHT

A "substantial" stockpile of Russian arms now is set aside to be sent to other countries where weapons can stir up trouble.

That is a new report by the top U.S. intelligence official, Allen W. Dulles.

Thousands of medium and heavy tanks, 4,000 to 6,000 MIG-15 jets, plus guns and am-

munition are in this reserve, Mr. Dulles declares.

Several countries in the Middle East have been approached with offers of these arms. Others, in Latin America, may be next.

How the non-Communist world can combat this and other Communist techniques is explained here by the U.S. intelligence chief.

Following are extracts from an address by Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, before the International Association of Chiefs of Police at Philadelphia, Oct. 3, 1955:

It is an honor to appear before this association, which represents so many of those engaged in law enforcement in the free world.

If I were asked to point out the most obvious difference between the free world and the Communist-dominated areas it would be this: The free world provides for law enforcement that protects the right and liberties of the individual. Here the police authority represents the very essence of democracy in action. Law enforcement in the Communist world looks first and foremost to safeguarding the ruling regime without regard for individual rights. Here the police authority becomes the shield of entrenched autocratic authority.

It is fortunate that over the years steady progress has been made in improving our techniques of law enforcement and in building up co-operation between the various jurisdictions of police authorities on both a national and international scale. For since 1917, and increasingly during the past decade, the problem of maintaining domestic law and order has had to face a new and unprecedented danger—world-wide Communist activity.

What we often refer to as organized crime on the domestic front certainly presents you with plenty of problems. But there is a sharp difference between the resources and capabilities of the private criminal, whether acting singly or in organized groups, and the international conspiracy of Communism, with its headquarters in Moscow, an affiliated organization in Peiping, and branch offices in Warsaw, Prague and many other centers.

Such a world-wide conspiracy as this fosters no ordinary breed of criminal.

It is engaged in no ordinary type of law breaking. Its members are carefully trained, operate with great skill and with the backing of a far-flung and efficient organization. Its work is often hard to detect, partly because the motives which influence the ordinary criminal are lacking.


Here the real motive is the weakening of the fabric of non-Communist states in time of peace in order that it may be vulnerable to the long-range designs of the Communist movement. The success so far achieved, here and in many other countries, in controlling this conspiracy is a fine tribute to the efficiency of the police organizations of the free world.

The Soviets keep as a closely guarded secret the number of their own citizens and of foreign indigenous agents who are trained in the U.S.S.R., in China, and in the satellites for subversion and espionage. Certainly there are many tens of thousands. As the students graduate, they flow into the Communist apparatus throughout the world. You have undoubtedly met some of these alumni and, if not, you certainly will.

Some high members of the MVD [Soviet secret police] have revolted against the methods they have been taught to practice, and have come over voluntarily—"defected"—to the free world. They have told us much. Some of this has been published to the world. The Petrov case in Australia is a good example of this. In other cases, for security reasons, it has seemed to be wiser to hold back on publicity to help us to delve more deeply into the Communist organization and practices.

We estimate that the Soviet expenditures in training, support and operation of its over-all subversive mechanism may approach 10 per cent of its expenditure on its over-all armament program. On a comparable basis, that is, assuming that we spent a comparable percentage of our defense budget for defense against these activities, we would be allocating to this

(Continued on page 128)



—Harris & Ewing

ALLEN W. DULLES

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work some 3 to 4 billion dollars annually. I need hardly tell you that such is not the case!

The importance of police and other internal-security forces in this work has become more and more evident in many parts of the world. Our conventional military forces are normally designed to cope with open, external aggression. Where countries are subject to Communist subversive tactics, the internal-security forces must generally be the first line of defense. It is up to them to ferret out the agents of subversion, stop the damage before it gets out of hand, and thus maintain internal domestic peace and quiet without the necessity for calling on the military forces to deal with open revolt.

In some instances—take Czechoslovakia in 1948, for example—where the police force is infiltrated or comes under ineffective leadership, the damage may be done before the armed forces have an opportunity to strike a single blow.

The need for effective police and internal-security forces is particularly felt in those countries which are on or near the borders of the Communist bloc. Here there is a vital need for protection against what has been called "internal invasion." As Communist agents and troublemakers infiltrate into such countries and cause disorders, the governments must have security forces which can spot and arrest the leaders and break up Communist-inspired riots and demonstrations. This does not call for tanks and jet aircraft; it calls for a trained and loyal police.

The various American programs for military and technical assistance to critical and underdeveloped areas can only bear fruit in a secure environment. It is for this reason that a number of countries where such aid is extended have requested that our programs should include help in building up the technical competence of local security forces to help to keep the peace internally and root out and suppress subversion.

The trained police of this and other free countries where the art of maintaining order is well developed will no doubt be more and more called on to contribute their skills and manpower to help in this important phase of anti-Communist activity. While I am on the subject of Communist techniques, I might mention a somewhat recent development in their program of sowing international discord—the Kremlin's new Trojan horse—but one that will look quite attractive to many countries which are under pressure to build up their military establishments.

How Soviet Stockpile Grew

As is well known, the Soviet emerged from World War II with a substantial stockpile of obsolescent and now fairly obsolete military equipment. This included, in addition to small arms, a good many thousands of medium and heavy tanks. Immediately following the war's end, the Soviet developed a whole new series of types of tanks and aircraft, including, in aircraft, for example, the MIG-15 fighter plane, the TU-4 (B-29 type) long-range piston bomber, and more recently the IL-28 light jet bomber.

It is now estimated that the Soviet has many thousands of these types of war equipment, some becoming obsolete, some surplus. All are likely to be replaced over the next few years. New tanks are in mass production, and new long and medium-range bombers are coming off the assembly line. For example, the replacement of obsolescent MIG-15s with newer models has created a reserve of some 4,000 to 6,000 MIG-15s, of which a very substantial number could be off-loaded as an adjunct to a general program of causing trouble throughout the world. Of course, a good share of this equipment has already gone to Communist China and to Indo-China, with

results which are now clearly seen. There remains ample for other parts of the world, and we now hear of advanced negotiations with several countries of the Middle East. I should not be at all surprised if we soon heard that countries in this Hemisphere were being approached.

A premature start with this program was made over a year ago. You will remember that it was a shipload of obsolete arms sent by Czechoslovakia to Guatemala in the ill-famed freighter *Alfhem* [in 1954], which aroused the Guatemalan people to a realization of the Communist plans for a takeover of that country. Once again Czechoslovakia looms up as the front for the delivery of Communist arms—this time in the Middle East.

While this type of activity may not enter directly into your day-by-day work, it bears closely upon the over-all international security problem. We should keep a careful watch against the possibility that some of these surplus arms, particularly small arms, may find their way into the hands of selected unscrupulous private vendors and be used indiscriminately to foment trouble.

What Past Errors Show

If one looks back to intelligence failures of the past—Pearl Harbor, for example—we find that the error has generally come not in a miscalculation of enemy strength but in a miscalculation of enemy intentions. Of course, the policy maker often has to take a calculated risk where hostile intentions are not clear, and this applies both in the military and the political fields.

Today, of course, not only intelligence officers but millions of men and women throughout the world are trying to form their own intelligence estimate of the real intentions of the Soviet in the light of the recent Geneva Conference. Together with them, the intelligence agencies are scanning the reports and analyzing the signs and trends as well as the statements and actions of the Soviet leaders themselves.

A few days ago, at a banquet for the East German Communists, Nikita Khrushchev, the head of the Soviet Communist Party, made some interesting statements. It was one of his informal and likewise revealing speeches. He remarked, as reported by the radio and press services, that if anyone believes that our smiles involve abandonment of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin—the name of Stalin was added, according to the official East German broadcasts, but does not appear in the Moscow reports—he deceives himself poorly. Those who wait for that, he said, must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle.

There is some debate among the experts whether the word should be shrimp or crayfish for there is an old Russian proverb that says: "I will do it when the crayfish whistles on the mountaintop." This, I understand, is a Russian way of saying "never"—although I learn on good authority that in the deep reaches of the sea, as detected by modern science, the crayfish or the shrimp do make some gurgling noises.

There is no hard evidence as yet, which we as intelligence or law-enforcing officers can accept, that the dangers we face from the secret underground subversive activities of Communism have ceased. Let us hope it does. Let us hope that Khrushchev hears the shrill call of the shrimp.

Meanwhile, in all free countries we cannot relax our vigilance in meeting the dual problem of protecting our national security from the lawless elements within and the lawless elements directed and controlled from without. In these tasks we shall need sound intelligence as to the external and internal dangers to ensure effective enforcement of law within a framework which safeguards the rights of the individual.